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Abstract—We consider a mobile market driven by two Mobile
Network Operators (MNOs) and a new competitor Mobile
Virtual Network Operator (MVNO). The MNOs can partner with
the entrant MVNO by leasing network resources; however, the
MVNO can also rely on other technologies such as free WiFi
access points. Moreover, in addition to its connectivity offer, the
MVNO can also draw indirect revenues from services due to its
brand. In that framework including many access technologies
and several revenue sources, a possible partner MNO will then
have to decide which wholesale price to charge the MVNO for its
resources. This multi-actor context, added to the need to consider
both wholesale and retail markets, represents a new challenge
for the underlying decision-making process. In this paper, the
optimal price setting is formulated as a multi-level optimization
problem which enables us to derive closed-form expressions for
the optimal MNOs wholesale prices and the optimal MVNO retail
price. The price attractivity of the MVNO is also evaluated in
terms of its indirect revenues and the proportion of resources
leased from possible partner MNOs. Finally, through a game-
theoretical approach, we characterize the scenario where both
MNOs partner with the MVNO as the unique Nash equilibrium
under appropriate conditions.
Index Terms—Network Economics, Strategic Partnership,
Multi-Level Optimization, Non-Cooperative Game Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile telecommunication markets are usually covered by
a few number of operators because of high infrastructure and
spectrum license costs. In addition, mobile operators are facing
the challenges of upgrading their networks to 5G technology in
order to cope with the increasing demand of users’ traffic. This
context, as well as the virtualization of wireless networks, may
lower the barrier for the entrance of Mobile Virtual Network
Operators (MVNO) to the market. While not possessing their
own network infrastructure, MVNOs can lease capacities from
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) on the wholesale market
to ensure wireless services to their customers.
A new generation of MVNOs has recently emerged, capable
of leasing resources from different MNOs while also taking
advantage of the available WiFi hotspots in order to propose a
full connectivity offer to their customers. The latter can there-
fore afford to blindly use multiple network/technology services
to establish the communications and use mobile Internet with-
out any specific setting. Typically, such MVNOs can launch
their activity thanks to specific inter-operator partnerships with
MNOs for the cellular infrastructure utilization while the WiFi
offloading part remains a unilateral decision. A recent example
is offered by Google through its Project-Fi [1], launched in
the U.S. in partnership with three leading MNOs, namely
Sprint, T-Mobile and U.S. Cellular. This illustrates the case
of a competitive MVNO able to absorb a significant part of
the retail market (on mobile and data services) from the MNOs
without being an expert in networking or even possessing the
physical infrastructures and the ability to manage them.
On the other hand, an entrant MVNO can be already
positioned at a higher place in the Value Chain and have
income from its new customers through its current “non telco”
activity. In fact, this MVNO may have a good reputation as
an OTT (”Over the Top”) providing content or other high
level services; it can thus draw significant additional revenue,
hereafter termed as indirect to differentiate it from the telco
offer, from its new customers.
This new multi-technological and multi-activity context
therefore raises new questions as to the interactions between
MNOs and such a MVNO, namely the optimal price setting
adopted by all actors and the consequences on the respective
market shares and profits. The economic viability of a possible
partnership between MNOs and the MVNO should, in partic-
ular, be understood on account of the existence of alternative
technologies and other sources of revenues.
A. State-of-the-art
The ecosystem of MNO-MVNO relationships has been
addressed in many studies. A detailed description of the
MVNOs’ classes in terms of their dependence to the host
operator is presented in [2], where it is shown that a MVNO
can be classified as either light or full. The authors describe,
in particular, the possible business models of MVNOs and
examine the impact of different parameters such as the MNO’s
market share on the outcome of cooperation between the host
and virtual operators. In [3], the authors analyze the incentives
for MNOs to form a strategic cooperation with MVNOs. They
specifically examine the effects of the brand appeal of the
MVNO and the wholesale discount offered by the MNO on
the fulfillment of mutually beneficial partnerships.
Besides, the economic viability of MNO-MVNO relation-
ship has been investigated in [4], [5] and references therein.
First in [4], it is argued that the business of a MVNO may be
profitable in a transitory phase when it partners with MNOs
with a small market share; however, it is shown in [5] that,
in the long term, the MVNO is better off when it preferably
partners with a big MNO, say, the incumbent. The latter pointISBN 978-3-903176-08-9 c© 2018 IFIP
of view of a stabilized market and mature economic actors
will be adopted in the sequel.
A multi-stage game for modeling the MNO-MVNO inter-
action is presented in [6] where the MNO investment, the
MVNO’s decision on the leasing from the MNO and the
retail pricing are successively focused on at each stage. In [7],
spectrum leasing and pricing are studied with game-theoretic
models. A comprehensive study of the market share between
MNO and MVNO based on the brand appeal of the MNO is
provided in [8] where the authors also use game theory tools.
A recent study of Google-Fi like MVNOs is provided in
[9] where the price setting between multiple service providers
and the virtual operator is examined. In that paper, the user
defection rate to the MVNO is assumed to be simply constant
with no account of the impact of the MVNO price on its
customer base; further, the authors only optimize the MVNO
price for given wholesale MNO prices.
In contrast, we will here consider a more accurate economic
model wherein (1) using the so-called price-demand elasticity,
the users reply to the MVNO offer depends on the varying
price difference between the MVNO offer and that of the other
MNOs; (2) beside the search of an optimal retail price for
the MVNO, we also determine the wholesale MNO prices by
maximizing their respective profit.
B. Addressed issues and contributions
In this paper, we make a thorough economic analysis of
strategic MNO-MVNO partnership. We consider the upcoming
of a new MVNO, a potential competitor proposing low-cost
services and threatening the MNO market share. Specifically,
we address the following questions:
• When a MNO decides to conclude a partnership with
the MVNO, what is the best price setting for the partner
MNO in order to maximize its profit?
• When the wholesale prices are fixed by partner MNOs,
what is the optimal price that should be charged by the
MVNO to its customers ?
• What is the impact of the MVNO’s indirect revenues on
its optimal retail price ?
• What is the best decision for the MNOs facing the entry
of the MVNO?
In this aim, the optimal price setting is addressed via a Stackel-
berg Game involving leaders and followers [5] (Section 2.3.6).
In particular, we define and study two different decision-
making models for the optimal wholesale price setting, namely
a fully sequential model and a partially sequential model;
we then determine the optimal retail price of the MVNO.
Furthermore, we study the impact of the MVNO’s indirect
revenue on its optimal retail price in both decision-making
models. Finally, we propose a game-theoretical approach to
determine the Nash equilibrium under sufficient conditions on
this indirect revenue and discuss its economic interpretation.
C. Paper structure
In Section II, we formally introduce the economic model
describing the interactions between MNOs and the MVNO. In
Section III, we formulate the price setting problem and study
the wholesale and retail price optimization for all actors. A
game-theoretical setting is discussed in Section IV. In Section
V, we comment our general results on economic grounds.
Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. ECONOMIC MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a mobile operator market composed of two
MNOs that share the whole customer base. The upcoming
of a new MVNO proposing an attractive price impacts the
repartition of customers who can defect from their original
operators to the benefit of this MVNO. The MNOs must then
identify the best decisions they are able to make, that is,
to decide whether to partner with the MVNO. An operator
that would decide to contract a partnership with the MVNO
would obviously not be immune to lose customers but might,
nevertheless, recover a part of the lost retail revenue via
the wholesale income. Given this ecosystem, the economic
variables of the MNOs and MVNO activity can be described
as follows:
MNO’s profit: the profit of a MNO is the sum of its
revenues obtained from the retail market for end-users (and
possibly from the Business-to-Business wholesale market for
partner MNOs) from which are subtracted the corresponding
costs. Denote by pi (resp. wi) the unit price of MNO i on
the retail (resp. the wholesale) market; the retail revenues
then depend linearly on the operator’s customer base, while
the wholesale revenues depend linearly on the amount of
MVNO traffic accommodated by the MNO’s network. Besides,
we consider unit network costs ci, non-network costs c˜i (IT,
commercial, etc.) and fixed costs Ci; as a linear approximation,
the total network and non-network costs are assumed to
depend linearly on the customer base whereas fixed costs are
independent of the amount of the operator’s customer base;
MVNO’s profit: the total revenue of the MVNO is the sum
of direct revenues obtained from the retail market (with net
unit price p0) and of indirect revenues (with unit price r0)
obtained from e.g. advertising. As to network costs, we here
consider that the MVNO enables its users’ devices either to
automatically connect to a free public WiFi Access Point (AP)
or to a partner MNO’s network, depending on the Quality of
Service of each access mode. The proportion of MVNO traffic
handled by free WiFi APs is denoted by γ ∈ [0, 1[; the only
network costs of the MVNO are therefore those caused by
the other proportion 1−γ of traffic dealt with MNOs through
partnerships. In addition to these network costs, the MVNO
finally incurs non-network and fixed costs denoted by c˜0 and
C0, respectively.
For both MNOs, we assume that long-distance (backhaul
and core) network costs are negligible compared to the access
costs; the possible wholesale offer of any MNO will therefore
mainly account for the transportation through its cellular
access network of MVNO traffic.
Users Behavior: the users’ reply to the MVNO’s offer is
assumed to depend only on the relative price of that offer.
Specifically, the behavior of users is modeled according to
TABLE I
KEY TERMS AND SYMBOLS
Symbol Definition (i = 1, 2)
pi, ci, c˜i Unit retail price, network and non-network costs
of MNO i
Ci Fixed costs of MNO i
Qi Customer base of MNO i before the MVNO’s entry
Q Total customer base
pii = Qi/Q Market share of MNO i before the MVNO’s entry
Qi,0 Customer base of MNO i which defects to the MVNO
Q0 Total customer base of the MVNO
r0 Net unit indirect revenues of the MVNO
p0, c˜0 Unit retail price, non-network costs of the MVNO
C0 Fixed costs of the MVNO
wi Unit wholesale price charged by MNO i to the MVNO
γ Proportion of MVNO traffic handled by
free WiFi APs
TABLE II
MVNO TRAFFIC SPLIT
Traffic Amount Accommodation
γQ0 WiFi APs
(1 − γ)pi1Q0 MNO 1’s Cellular BSs
(1 − γ)pi2Q0 MNO 2’s Cellular BSs
the price-demand elasticity [10] so that the part of MNO i
customers which defects to the MVNO is expressed by
Qi,0 = εQi
(
pi − p0
pi
)
(1)
where Qi denotes the customer base of MNO i before the
MVNO joins the market and ε > 0 is the price-demand
elasticity coefficient (although generally depending on prices,
ε is here assumed to be a constant on the basis of a small
price variability range). Without loss of generality, we assume
throughout the paper that p2 6 p1 and p0 6 p2; this ensures
that both Q1,0 and Q2,0 are non-negative. The MVNO’s total
customer base is then
Q0 = Q1,0 +Q2,0. (2)
MVNO traffic split: in the case when both MNOs partner
with the MVNO, the MVNO traffic which is not supported
by free WiFi APs is split between MNOs networks propor-
tionally to their market share before the MVNO’s upcoming.
Consequently, the traffic transported for the MVNO on MNO
i network equals (1−γ)piiQ0, where pii = Qi/Q is the market
share of MNO i before the MVNO’s entry (with pi1+pi2 = 1).
This is motivated by the fact that the MVNO will partner with
a MNO all the more that the latter has a large market share.
Note finally that a sample value of parameter γ is given by
the ratio of the duration spent on WiFi access to the overall
duration of a given communication session; this ratio can
then be averaged over all successive sessions to provide the
mean proportion γ; the latter is clearly related to the given
geographic density of the WiFi APs.
Tables I and II sum up the notation used in the paper.
III. WHOLESALE AND RETAIL PRICE SETTING
In this section, we address the optimization of MNOs and
MVNO profits in order to determine the optimal wholesale and
retail prices. Specifically, we introduce several optimization
problems where wi, i ∈ {1, 2}, and p0 are the decision
variables. In the sequel, we denote by ”Part” the strategy
consisting in partnering with the MVNO and by ”NonPart”
the strategy consisting in not partnering with the MVNO. In
a competitive environment where the MNOs do not collude
with each other, two scenarios can be envisaged:
A. Only one operator, either MNO 1 or MNO 2, decides
to contract with the MVNO. We denote this scenario by
(Part-NonPart) or (NonPart-Part), respectively;
B. Both operators choose to contract with the MVNO. We
denote this scenario by (Part-Part).
These two scenarios are successively analyzed below.
A. Scenario (Part-NonPart)
Consider first the case when only MNO i proposes a
wholesale offer to the MVNO, while MNO −i decides not
to partner with the new entrant (by convention, i = 1 or 2
implies −i = 2 or 1). In this case, the traffic γQ0 generated
by the MVNO’s users will be delivered through free WiFi APs
and the remaining (1 − γ)Q0 will be handled by the partner
MNO’s network. The MVNO’s profit is therefore given by
R0(p0, wi) = (p0 + r0)Q0 − wi(1− γ)Q0 − c˜0Q0 − C0. (3)
The optimal MVNO’s retail price p∗0 can then be determined
by solving the following optimization problem:
max
06p06p2
R0(p0, wi). (4)
Lemma 1. In the (Part-NonPart) scenario, given the whole-
sale price wi, the optimal MVNO retail price equals
p∗0(wi) = min(p˜0(wi), p2) (5)
where
p˜0(wi) =
1− γ
2
wi +
Q
2S
+
c˜0 − r0
2
, (6)
with S = Q1/p1 +Q2/p2.
Proof. First observe that, in view of definitions (1) and (2),
Q0 involved in expression (3) is a linear function of vari-
able p0, thus making the profit R0 a quadratic function of
p0. Given the price wi, the first order optimality condition
∂R0(p0, wi)/∂p0 = 0 for problem (4) then provides the
critical point p˜0(wi) as given in (6). Besides, the second
derivative ∂2R0(p0, wi)/∂p
2
0 is equal to the negative constant
−2εS; R0(p0, wi) is therefore a strictly concave function of
p0 with a unique maximum at price p
∗
0(wi) given by (5).
Now, we consider the profit of MNO i given by
Ri(p0, wi) = pi(Qi −Qi,0) + wi(1 − γ)Q0 −
ci(Qi −Qi,0 + (1− γ)Q0) −
c˜i(Qi −Qi,0)− Ci,
that is,
Ri(p0, wi) = hi(Qi −Qi,0) + (wi − ci)(1 − γ)Q0 − Ci (7)
where hi = pi − ci − c˜i > 0. The partner MNO i seeks to
maximize its profit Ri. To this end, we replace p0 involved
in expression (7) via Qi,0 and Q0 by its optimal value p
∗
0(wi)
derived in Lemma 1; in fact, the MNO anticipates the best
pricing strategy of the MVNO and thus sets its optimal
wholesale price based on this anticipation. Define then
R∗i (wi) = Ri(p
∗
0(wi), wi) (8)
which is obtained through (7) withQi,0 = εQi(pi−p
∗
0(wi))/pi
and Q0 given by (2). The optimization problem for MNO i
can then be expressed by
max
wi>0
R∗i (wi). (9)
Proposition 1. In the (Part-NonPart) scenario, the optimal
MNO’s wholesale price equals
ŵi = min(wi, w˜i) (10)
where we set
wi =
1
1− γ
(
2p2 −
Q
S
+ r0 − c˜0
)
(11)
and
w˜i =
ci
2
+
1
1− γ
(
hiQi
2piS
+
Q
2S
+
r0 − c˜0
2
)
. (12)
The optimal MVNO’s retail price is then determined by
p̂0(ŵi) = min(p˜0(ŵi), p2). (13)
Defining the constant
ri,0 =
hiQi
piS
+ ci(1− γ) +
3Q
S
+ c˜0 − 4p2, (14)
we then have wi 6 w˜i ⇐⇒ p
∗
0(ŵi) = p2 ⇐⇒ r0 6 ri,0.
Proof. We consider the two cases (a) p˜0(wi) > p2 and (b)
p˜0(wi) 6 p2. First consider case (a). This corresponds to
values of wi such that wi > wi where wi is given by (11).
Relation (5) then yields p∗0(wi) = p2 and by (8), we easily
show that R∗i (wi) = Ri(p2, wi) is a linear and increasing
function of wi. The optimal value of R
∗
i is thus obtained at
wi = +∞; but this unbounded price giving the value −∞ for
R0, case (a) is thus eventually excluded.
Now consider case (b). This corresponds to values of wi
such that wi 6 wi. Relation (5) now yields p
∗
0(wi) = p˜0(wi);
using (8) again and writing now
Qi,0 = ε
Qi
pi
(pi − p˜0(wi)), Q0 = Q1,0 +Q2,0
as functions of wi, R
∗
i (wi) = Ri(p˜0(wi), wi) can then be
easily expressed as a quadratic function of wi. The first order
optimality condition ∂R∗i (wi)/∂wi = 0 for problem (9) yields
the critical point w˜i as given in (12). Besides, the second
derivative ∂2R∗i (wi)/∂w
2
i is equal to the negative constant
Leader MNO
i chooses wi
MNO −i
chooses w−i
MVNO
chooses p0
MNO 1
chooses w1
MNO 2
chooses w2
MVNO
chooses p0
Fig. 1. Hierarchical decision models. Left, Fully sequential model. Right,
Partially sequential model.
−ε(1 − γ)2S/2. Therefore, R∗i (wi) is a strictly concave
function of wi with a unique maximum at ŵi given by (10).
The optimal MVNO’s retail price is obtained by replacing
wi in (5) by ŵi given in (10), hence (13). Finally, elementary
algebra reduces condition wi 6 w˜i to r0 6 ri,0, with ri,0
given by (14).
All previous results symmetrically hold for the (NonPart-
Part) scenario.
B. Scenario (Part-Part)
We now turn to the situation where both MNOs partner with
the MVNO. Two models can be proposed depending on the
order in which decisions are taken, namely:
• A Fully Sequential (FS) model where a leader MNO
(say, the one with the highest market share) first chooses
its wholesale price; then the second MNO, the follower,
determines its wholesale price accordingly; finally, the
MVNO chooses its retail price. This situation is illus-
trated in Fig. 1-Left.
• A Partially Sequential (PS) model where first the two
MNOs (say, with comparable weights) choose their re-
spective wholesale price without coordination; then, the
MVNO chooses its retail price. This situation is illus-
trated in Fig. 1-Right.
In both models, we consider that the MNOs move before the
MVNO because they own the resources to lease to the latter.
They forecast the MVNO’s reply to their pricing strategies and
choose the wholesale prices that maximize their profits, given
the anticipated MVNO’s optimal pricing strategy. The MVNO
eventually chooses its retail price, given the wholesale prices
fixed by the MNOs.
The MVNO’s profit is now given by
R0(p0, w1, w2) = (p0 + r0)Q0 − w1(1− γ)pi1Q0 −
w2(1− γ)pi2Q0 − c˜0Q0 − C0 (15)
and the optimization problem of the MVNO is formulated by
max
06p06p2
R0(p0, w1, w2). (16)
Lemma 2. In the (Part-Part) scenario, given the wholesale
prices w1 and w2, the optimal retail price of the MVNO equals
p∗0(w1, w2) = min(p˜0(w1, w2), p2) (17)
where
p˜0(w1, w2) =
(1− γ)
2
(pi1w1 + pi2w2) +
Q
2S
+
c˜0 − r0
2
. (18)
Proof. Similar to that of Lemma 1.
In this section, the notations for profit Ri should not be
confused with that of Section III-A. Now, consider the profit
of MNO i ∈ {1, 2} given by
Ri(p0, wi) = pi(Qi −Qi,0) + wi(1− γ)piiQ0 −
ci(Qi −Qi,0 + (1 − γ)piiQ0)−
c˜i(Qi −Qi,0)− Ci,
that is,
Ri(p0, wi) = hi(Qi −Qi,0) + (19)
(wi − ci)(1− γ)piiQ0 − Ci
where we set hi = pi − ci − c˜i. Both MNO partners 1 and
2 seek to maximize their own profit R1 and R2. In order to
solve this optimization problem for either model (FS) or (PS),
we replace p0 by its optimal value p
∗
0(w1, w2) derived above
in Lemma 2. Define then
R∗i (w1, w2) = Ri(p
∗
0(w1, w2), wi) (20)
as obtained from (19) with Qi,0 = εQi(pi − p
∗
0(w1, w2))/pi
and Q0 given by (2).
We now successively address the maximization of MNOs
profits for the (FS) and (PS) models.
1) Fully Sequential Model: Assume that MNO i ∈ {1, 2}
is the leader and MNO −i is the follower (by convention,
−i = 2 if i = 1, and −i = 1 if i = 2). Given wi, the
follower thus decides on the wholesale price w−i to charge
the MVNO. The optimization problem for both MNOs can
then be expressed by the following bilevel formulation

max
wi>0
R∗i (w1, w2)|w−i=w∗
−i
,
subject to w∗−i = argmax
w−i>0
R∗−i(w1, w2)
(21)
where the notation |w−i = w
∗
−i means that function R
∗
i is
evaluated for the variable w−i equal to w
∗
−i; note that w
∗
−i is
a function of wi. The symmetrical case when MNO −i is the
leader is similarly defined. In order to solve problem (21), we
introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1. We denote by ∆ the closed triangular region
defined by ∆ = {(w1, w2) ∈ R
+ × R+ : p˜0(w1, w2) 6 p2}
where p˜0(w1, w2) is given by (18) (see Fig. 2).
Further denote by δ the boundary segment of ∆ defined by
δ = {(w1, w2) ∈ ∆ : p˜0(w1, w2) = p2}.
∆
w
C
w
A
w
B
δ
DA
DB
w˜
A
w˜
B
w1
w2
Fig. 2. The region ∆, its boundary δ, and the points wA, wB , w˜A, w˜B
and wC (lines DA and DB are invoked in Appendix VII-A).
Definition 2. Let wA = (wA1 , w
A
2 ) and w
B = (wB1 , w
B
2 )
denote the pair of prices given by

wA1 =
h1Q1
p1
+ c1(1 − γ)pi1S + 2Q− 2Sp2
(1− γ)pi1S
,
wA2 =
−
h1Q1
p1
− c1(1− γ)pi1S − 4Q+ 4p2S + T
(1− γ)pi2S
and

wB1 =
−
h2Q2
p2
− c2(1− γ)pi2S − 4Q+ 4p2S + T
(1− γ)pi1S
,
wB2 =
h2Q2
p2
+ c2(1 − γ)pi2S + 2Q− 2Sp2
(1− γ)pi2S
,
respectively, with T = Q+ (r0 − c˜0)S for short.
Define also the function Ω−i, i ∈ {1, 2}, by
Ω−i(wi) =
c−i
2
+
h−iQ−i
2p−i(1− γ)pi−iS
+
Q
2(1− γ)pi−iS
−
c˜0 − r0
2(1− γ)pi−i
−
pii
2pi−i
wi (22)
and the points w˜B = (w˜1,Ω2(w˜1)), w˜
A = (Ω1(w˜2), w˜2)
where
w˜i =
hiQi
pi
−
h−iQ−i
p−i
+ S(1− γ)(cipii − c−ipi−i) + T
2(1− γ)piiS
. (23)
Note that wA ∈ δ and wB ∈ δ; a geometric interpretation of
the pairs wA, wB and w˜
A
, w˜
B
is given in Appendix VII-A.
We can now state the following.
Proposition 2. Define the constant r0 by
r0 =
h1Q1
p1S
+
h2Q2
p2S
+(1−γ)(pi1c1+pi2c2)+
7Q
S
+ c˜0−8p2.
In the (Part-Part) scenario with FS model,
• if r0 6 r0 and MNO 1 (resp. MNO 2) is the leader, then
the optimal wholesale price vector (w∗1 , w
∗
2) is given by
wB ∈ δ (resp. wA ∈ δ) introduced above. In either case,
the optimal MVNO’s retail price is then
p∗0(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) = p2;
• if r0 > r0 and MNO 1 (resp. MNO 2) is the leader, then
the optimal wholesale price vector (w∗1 , w
∗
2) is given by
w˜
B ∈ ∆ \ δ (resp. w˜A ∈ ∆ \ δ) introduced above. In
either case, the optimal MVNO’s retail price is then
p∗0(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) = p˜0(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) < p2.
We defer the detailed proof to Appendix VII-A.
2) Partially Sequential Model: Now assume that MNOs
simultaneously choose their optimal wholesale prices. Given
(20), the joint optimization problem for both MNOs is thus
expressed by
max
w1>0
R∗1(w1, w2) (24)
and
max
w2>0
R∗2(w1, w2). (25)
Definition 3. Let wC = (wC1 , w
C
2 ) denote the pair of prices
given by

wC1 =
2h1Q1
p1
−
h2Q2
p2
+ (1 − γ)(2c1pi1 − c2pi2)S + T
3(1− γ)pi1S
,
wC2 =
2h2Q2
p2
−
h1Q1
p1
+ (1 − γ)(2c2pi2 − c1pi1)S + T
3(1− γ)pi2S
with T = Q+ (r0 − c˜0)S.
The pair wC is given a geometric interpretation in Appendix
VII-B. This enables us to state the following.
Proposition 3. Define the constant r♭0 by
r♭0 =
h1Q1
p1S
+
h2Q2
p2S
+(1−γ)(pi1c1+pi2c2)+
5Q
S
+ c˜0−6p2.
In the (Part-Part) scenario with PS model,
• if r0 > r
♭
0, the optimal wholesale price vector (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
is given by wC ∈ ∆\δ. The optimal MVNO’s retail price
is then
p∗0(w
C
1 , w
C
2 ) = p˜0(w
C
1 , w
C
2 ) < p2
as defined by (18);
• if r0 = r
♭
0, the optimal wholesale price vector (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)
is given by wC ∈ δ. The optimal MVNO’s retail price is
then p∗0 = p2;
• if r0 < r
♭
0, the problem (24)-(25) admits no solution.
The proof of Proposition 3 is detailed in Appendix VII-B.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
In this section, we propose a non-cooperative game-
theoretical model to formalize the competition between MNO
1 and MNO 2.
Definition 4. Introduce the two-player game where
− the players are MNO 1 and MNO 2,
− the strategies are either to contract with the new entrant,
”Part” strategy, or not to contract, ”NonPart” strategy,
− the payoffs are given by the matrix
( Part NonPart
Part (R∗1(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2),R
∗
2(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)) (R
∗
1(ŵ1),R2(ŵ1))
NonPart (R1(ŵ2),R
∗
2(ŵ2)) (R
0
1,R
0
2)
)
.
In this matrix, the pair (R01,R
0
2) corresponds to the scenario
when no MNO partners with the MVNO, thus forbidding its
entrance into the market.
We recall that a Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile
such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from this profile [11]. Besides, recall from definition (1) that
Qi,0 denotes the customer part which defects from MNO i to
the new entrant in the scenario (Part, Part); furthermore, let
Q̂i,0 denote the customer part which defects from MNO i to
the MVNO in the scenario (NonPart, Part), that is, when only
MNO −i contracts a partnership with the new entrant.
Lemma 3. In the FS model with r0 6 r0, a MNO loses more
customers when it is non-partner than when it is a partner of
the MVNO, that is, Q̂i,0 > Qi,0.
Proof. From Proposition 2 with r0 6 r0, we have
p∗0(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) = p2 while Proposition 1 entails p̂0(ŵ−i) 6 p2.
Using definition (1), we then deduce that the difference
Qi,0 − Q̂i,0 =
εQi
pi
(p̂0(ŵ−i)− p
∗
0(w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)) is non-positive,
as claimed.
As a consequence, we can formulate the subsequent result
on the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. In the FS model with r0 6 r0 and for
wholesale prices higher than network costs,
(a) the scenario (Part, Part) is a NE;
(b) if r0 6 min(r0, r2,0), (Part, Part) is the unique NE.
Proof. (a) Scenario (Part, Part) is a NE. Suppose that both
operators partner with the MVNO, that is, the scenario is
(Part, Part); consider MNO i and let R∗i (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) denote its
profit for this scenario. Assume now that MNO i unilaterally
switches from strategy ”Part” to strategy ”NonPart”; we denote
by Ri(ŵ−i) the profit of MNO i when it applies strategy
”NonPart” while MNO −i keeps strategy ”Part”. We then have
R∗i (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) = hi(Qi −Qi,0) + (w
∗
i − ci)(1− γ)piiQ0 − Ci
and Ri(ŵ−i) = hi(Qi − Q̂i,0)− Ci, so that
R∗i (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2)−Ri(ŵ−i) = hi(Q̂i,0 −Qi,0) + (w
∗
i − ci)×
(1− γ)piiQ0. (26)
As Q̂i,0 > Qi,0 by Lemma 3, the profit difference
R∗i (w
∗
1 , w
∗
2) − Ri(ŵ−i) in (26) is then non-negative after
assumptions hi > 0 and w
∗
i − ci > 0; MNO i then has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from strategy ”Part” since this
yields a profit decrease. (Part, Part) is thus a NE.
(b) (Part, Part) is the unique NE. Assume both MNOs
use strategy ”Non Part”. Now suppose MNO 2 unilaterally
switches to ”Part”; we first have R02 = h2Q2 − C2 while
R∗2(ŵ2) = h2(Q2 − Q̂2,0) + (ŵ2 − c2)(1 − γ)Q0 − C2 after
(7), hence
R∗2(ŵ2)−R
0
2 = −h2Q̂2,0 + (ŵ2 − c2)(1 − γ)Q0. (27)
From Proposition 1, we have Q̂2,0 = 0 if r0 6 r2,0; the
difference R∗2(ŵ2) − R
0
2 in (27) is then non-negative after
assumption ŵ2 − c2 > 0 and (Non Part, Non Part) is not a
NE. We conclude that if r0 6 r0 and r0 6 r2,0, (Part,Part) is
the only NE.
Note that a preliminary study has given us hints for
(Part,Part) to be still a NE for r0 > r0. For the PS model,
a similar analysis should also be addressed for r0 6 r
♭
0.
V. ECONOMIC DISCUSSION
The results obtained in the previous sections allow us to
provide the following comments.
Scenario (Part-Part): When both MNOs partner with the
MVNO, Propositions 2 and 3 entail that, when γ → 1, all
optimal wholesale prices are of order 1/(1−γ); this increasing
rate again confirms the effect of economy of scale. Now,
regarding the MVNO’s optimal retail price, we distinguish two
cases depending on the order in which decisions are taken by
MNOs. First, we have shown (Proposition 2) for the FS model
that the entrant MVNO charges its users the same price p2 as
the lowest MNO if r0 6 r0, thus attracting users only from the
MNO with the highest retail price; otherwise, it attracts users
from both MNOs. Second, we have shown (Proposition 3) for
the PS model that the entrant MVNO cannot set an optimal
retail price strictly lower than both MNOs’ prices unless it has
sufficiently high indirect revenues, that is, r0 > r
♭
0. Otherwise,
if r0 < r
♭
0, there is no wholesale prices that jointly optimize
both MNOs profits.
For each class of actors, we can conclude the following:
For the MVNO: for all scenarios, the MVNO retail price p∗0
decreases with r0; the MVNO can thus set a retail price strictly
lower than that of the MNOs if it has high enough indirect
revenues. Besides, the threshold value r0 (resp. r
♭
0) in model
FS (resp. model PS) is a decreasing function of the proportion
γ, so that the MVNO has an optimal retail price strictly lower
than that of both MNOs for large enough γ. The technological
independence of the MVNO from its partner MNOs due to free
WiFi access thus translates into an economic advantage on the
retail market (but this does not obviously account for better
QoS and security levels offered to its customers if a larger part
of MVNO traffic were transferred through optimized cellular
networks);
For the MNOs: for the FS model and under sufficient
conditions on the indirect revenue of the MVNO, the scenario
(Part, Part) defines the unique NE. This means that the MNOs
have then an incentive to partner with the new entrant: in fact,
the MNOs would in the first place prefer that the MVNO does
not enter the market in order to keep their customer base, but
each MNO fears that its competitor hosts the MVNO, in which
case it would incur losses both on the retail and wholesale
markets. As a consequence, both MNOs will eventually decide
to partner with the MVNO. In addition, a non-partner MNO
would incur higher retail losses if it were non-partner than
when it is a partner of the MVNO. Cooperating with the
MVNO therefore enables each MNO to compensate for a part
of its retail revenue losses.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, our contribution is twofold. First, we address
the price setting optimization problems for both MNOs and the
entrant MVNO in the framework of two distinct scenarios. In
this aim, we propose several mathematical programming for-
mulations for the underlying problems, each one correspond-
ing to a specific decision-making scheme; we also discuss
the economic interpretation of the optimal solution in each
case. Secondly, based on the optimal price setting step, we
provide a game-theoretical analysis of the MNOs competition
and show that (Part, Part) is the unique Nash Equilibrium, and
thus the most profitable scenario for both MNOs, provided
that appropriate conditions on the MVNO’s indirect revenue
are fulfilled.
The particular case of only two competing MNOs has
provided us with interesting results, and a natural extension
to this work would be to generalize the results obtained for
two MNOs to an arbitrary number (n > 3) of MNOs. Indeed,
the two-dimensional optimization problems that we have here
addressed may exhibit other features in the n-dimensional
case (e.g. several possible optimal points). Furthermore, the
associated n-player games could be amenable to cooperation
schemes among players which could be interestingly studied.
On the other hand, other demand models differing from
that considered in this paper (customer defection due to the
price/demand elasticity) could also be envisaged; alternative
models based on interactions between users or on the MVNO
brand appeal could capture other preference sources of users
towards each actor.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 2.
Recall that MNO i ∈ {1, 2} (resp. MNO −i) is assumed
to be the leader (resp. the follower). We successively consider
the two cases (a) (w1, w2) /∈ ∆ and (b) (w1, w2) ∈ ∆.
First consider case (a). In view of (17), this corresponds
to values of (w1, w2) such that p
∗
0(w1, w2) = p2 and by (20),
we easily show that R∗−i(w1, w2) = R−i(p2, w−i) is a linear
and increasing function of w−i. The optimal value of R
∗
−i is
thus obtained at w−i = +∞; as this unbounded price gives
the value −∞ for R0, case (a) can thus be excluded.
Now consider case (b). By (17), this corresponds to pairs
(w1, w2) such that p
∗
0(w1, w2) = p˜0(w1, w2). To solve the
optimization problem for follower MNO −i in (21) with given
wi, we introduce the associated Lagrange function given by
L−i(w1, w2, λ−i) = R
∗
−i(w1, w2)− λ−i (p˜0(w1, w2)− p2)
where λ−i is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the con-
straint p˜0(w1, w2) 6 p2; from definition (20) and the expres-
sion (18) of p˜0(w1, w2), R
∗
−i(w1, w2) is easily expressed as
a quadratic function of variable w−i. The system of Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) ([12], Chap.4, Sec. 4.2.13) conditions for
the Lagrangian L−i above can be written as

∂L−i
∂w−i
(w1, w2, λ−i) = 0,
λ−i > 0, λ−i
(
p˜0(w1, w2)− p2
)
= 0,
p˜0(w1, w2) 6 p2.
(28)
Two cases can intervene for the multiplier λ−i:
(I) if λ−i = 0, the first KKT condition in system (28) reads
∂R∗−i
∂w−i
(w1, w2) = 0; (29)
function R∗−i being quadratic, equation (29) is linear in both
variables w1, w2 and thus defines geometrically a line D
(displayed in Fig. 2 as line DB if −i = 2 or line DA
if −i = 1). Solving (29) for w−i then yields the unique
maximum at point w∗−i = Ω−i(wi) with function Ω−i defined
as in (22).
Now, consider the profit maximization in problem (21) for
the leader MNO i. In order to solve it, we replace w−i in the
profit R∗i (w1, w2) by the maximum w
∗
−i = Ω−i(wi) derived
above. Given (20), we thus define
R∗∗i (wi) = R
∗
i (w1, w2)|w−i=Ω−i(wi).
Recall that we consider case (b) for which (w1, w2) ∈ ∆ and
p∗0(w1, w2) = p˜0(w1, w2), so that the optimization problem
for leader MNO i eventually reads

max
wi>0
R∗∗i (wi),
subject to p˜0(w1, w2)|w−i=Ω−i(wi) 6 p2.
(30)
First, the constraint p˜0(w1, w2)|w−i=Ω−i(wi) 6 p2 in (30) is
easily translated into wi 6 wi where we set
wi =
−
h−iQ−i
p−i
− c−i(1− γ)pi−iS − 4Q+ 4p2S + T
(1− γ)piiS
with T = Q + (r0 − c˜0)S. Second, the 1st order condition
∂R∗∗i (wi)/∂wi = 0 for problem (30) yields the critical point
w˜i, given as in (23). The second derivative ∂
2R∗∗i (wi)/∂w
2
i
being equal to the negative constant −ε(1 − γ)2pi2i S/2,
R∗∗i (wi) is therefore a strictly concave function of wi and
has a unique maximum on R+ at w˜i. It thus follows from the
latter discussion that
w∗i = min(w˜i, wi)
is the unique solution to problem (30). Now, we easily verify
that w˜i > wi ⇐⇒ r0 6 r0 where r0 is expressed in Proposi-
tion 2. We thus conclude that if r0 6 r0, the optimal solution is
the intersection pointw∗ = (w1,Ω2(w1)) = w
B ∈ DB∩δ when
i = 1, or w∗ = (Ω1(w2), w2) = w
A ∈ DA ∩ δ when i = 2;
otherwise, if r0 > r0, the optimal solution is the intersection
point w∗ = (w˜1,Ω2(w˜1)) = w˜
B
∈ DB ∩ ∆ when i = 1, or
w∗ = (Ω1(w˜2), w˜2) = w˜
A
∈ DA ∩∆ when i = 2;.
(II) otherwise, if λ−i > 0, the first KKT condition
∂L−i(w1, w2, λ−i)/∂w−i = 0 in system (28) yields
w−i = ω¯−i(λ−i, wi), (31)
with ω−i(λ−i, wi) = Ai(wi)/εS(1− γ)pi−i where we set
Ai(wi) = ε
h−iQ−i
2p−i
+ ε
Q
2
− εSwi
1− γ
2
pii − εS
c˜0 − r0
2
+
εc−i(1 − γ)pi−i
S
2
−
λ−i
2
.
The complementary slackness condition p˜0(w1, w2) = p2 then
eventually reduces to λ−i = Λ−i(wi) where
Λ−i(wi) = εS(1 − γ)piiwi + ε
h−iQ−i
p−i
+ 3εQ +
εS(c˜0 − r0) + εSc−i(1 − γ)pi−i − 4εSp2.
By inserting this expression of λ−i = Λ−i(wi) into the right-
hand side of (31), we finally get w−i = Ω−i(wi) where
Ω−i(wi) =
−(1− γ)piiSwi −Q− S(c˜0 − r0) + 2Sp2
S(1 − γ)pi−i
.
Now, consider the profit of leader MNO i given by
R∗∗i (wi) = R
∗
i (w1, w2)|w−i=Ω−i(wi).
The first derivative of R∗∗i (wi) with respect to wi equals
dR∗∗i (wi)/dwi = pii(1 − γ)Q0 and is strictly positive; but in
the present case, wi ∈ [0, w
0
i ] where w
0
i is either the abcissa
or the ordinate of the intersection point of line δ with the
axis w−i = 0. The corresponding optimal unit price w
∗
−i for
the follower MNO −i is therefore 0; as having no economic
relevance for this partner MNO, this case (II) is eventually
excluded.
B. Proof of Proposition 3.
We successively consider the two cases (a) (w1, w2) /∈ ∆
and (b) (w1, w2) ∈ ∆.
First consider case (a). In view of (17), this corresponds
to pairs (w1, w2) such that p
∗
0(w1, w2) = p2 and by (20),
we easily show that R∗i (w1, w2) = Ri(p2, wi) is a linear and
increasing function of wi, i ∈ {1, 2}. The optimal value of R
∗
i
is thus obtained at wi = +∞; as this unbounded price gives
the value −∞ for R0, case (a) can therefore be excluded.
Now consider case (b). In view of (17), this corresponds to
values of (w1, w2) such that p
∗
0(w1, w2) = p˜0(w1, w2). From
definition (20) and the expression (18) of p˜0(w1, w2), each
function R∗1(w1, w2) and R
∗
2(w1, w2) is again expressed as
a quadratic function of variable w1 and w2, respectively. The
KKT conditions associated with optimization problem (24) for
MNO 1, and optimization problem (25) for MNO 2, read

∂R∗i
∂wi
(w1, w2) = λi
(1− γ)pii
2
,
λi > 0, λi(p˜0(w1, w2)− p2) = 0,
p˜0(w1, w2) 6 p2;
(32)
for i = 1 and i = 2, respectively. At this point, we need to
distinguish three cases according to the values of the Lagrange
multipliers (I) λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0, (II) λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0,
(III) λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0 (or reversely λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0).
(I) First assume λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. The simultaneous
conditions
∂R∗1
∂w1
(w1, w2) = 0,
∂R∗2
∂w2
(w1, w2) = 0
yield the critical pair wC ∈ DA ∩ DB , intersection point
of lines DA and DB defined in (29). For each i ∈ {1, 2},
the second derivative ∂2R∗i (w1, w2)/∂w
2
i equals the negative
constant−ε(1−γ)2pi2i S; R
∗
i is thus a strictly concave function
of the variable wi and the point w
C is therefore the unique
joint maximum for R∗1 and R
∗
2. Besides, it is readily shown
that p˜0(w
C
1 , w
C
2 ) < p2 if and only if r0 > r
♭
0; in such a case,
we then have wC ∈ ∆ \ δ and this point wC is the optimal
pair of wholesale prices.
(II) Now assume λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. Solving each KKT
system (32) for i = 1 and i = 2, we get

w1(λ1) =
h1Q1
p1
+ c1(1− γ)pi1S + 2Q− 2Sp2 −
λ1
ε
(1− γ)pi1S
,
w2(λ1) =
h2Q2
p2
+ c2(1− γ)pi2S + 2Q− 2Sp2 −
λ2
ε
(1− γ)pi2S
,
λ1 + λ2 = εS(r
♭
0 − r0).
We have λ1 + λ2 > 0 if and only if r0 < r
♭
0. Calculating
the respective values of ϕ1(λ1) = R
∗
1(w1(λ1), w2(λ1)) and
ϕ2(λ1) = R
∗
2(w1(λ1), w2(λ1)) easily shows that ϕ1 and
ϕ2 are linear functions over interval [0, εS(r
♭
0 − r0)] with
respective maximum at λ1 = 0 and λ1 = εS(r
♭
0 − r0) (see
Fig. 3). Consequently, there cannot be a joint solution that
maximizes both R∗1(w1, w2) and R
∗
2(w1, w2) unless r0 = r
♭
0,
in which case the optimal point coincides with wC .
ϕ1(λ1) ϕ2(λ1)
εS(r♭0 − r0)0
λ1
Fig. 3. Variations of linear functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 on interval [0, εS(r♭0−r0)].
(III) Finally assume λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0. Solving then each
KKT system (32) for i = 1 and i = 2 yields the critical pair
w
A and the value λ2 = εS(r
♭
0 − r0); in particular, we have
λ2 > 0 if and only if r0 < r
♭
0. Therefore, w
A is the pair
of optimal wholesale prices when r0 < r
♭
0. Symmetrically,
the case λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0 gives the optimal pair w
B if
r0 < r
♭
0. In view of the above properties of functions ϕ1 and
ϕ2, however, we easily show that neither w
A nor wB can be a
joint solution that simultaneously maximizes R∗1(w1, w2) and
R∗2(w1, w2), as required in (24) and (25). This joint problem
has consequently no solution when r0 < r
♭
0.
